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    <title>Notebooks   </title>
    <link>http://bactra.org/notebooks</link>
    <description>Cosma's Notebooks</description>
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  <item>
    <title>Ethics, Game Theory and Biology</title>
    <link>http://bactra.org/notebooks/2009/04/10#ethics-biology</link>
    <description>


&lt;P&gt;One of the ideas I'm very fond of is that virtue isn't its own reward, it's
a dominating strategy.  More precisely, I am interested to see how far one can
go towards showing that behaving ethically is actually a very good bet if one
wants to come out ahead materially.  Obviously there are times when nice guys
lose, but it is an ancient observation that even a band of robbers must observe
certain principles of morality among themselves, or perish.  (So ancient I
won't bother to try to run it down.  See, however, Strauss's
&lt;cite&gt;Persecution and the Art of Writing.&lt;/citE&gt;) How far can we go with such
reasoning?

&lt;P&gt;The experiments of Robert Axelrod seem to indicate that a stance of &quot;Be
nice to everyone, but if someone hits you, hit back&quot; is a &lt;em&gt;very&lt;/em&gt; good
bet.  (When &lt;cite&gt;The Matrix&lt;/cite&gt; came out, one reviewer, I think it was
Stuart Klawans in
&lt;cite&gt;The Nation,&lt;/cite&gt; described the hero as &quot;a Boddhisatva with compassion
for all living things and the firepower to &lt;em&gt;back it up&lt;/em&gt;&quot;: just so.)
Sam Bowles and Herb Gintis have worked up from Axelrod's Tit for Tat to
&quot;strong reciprocity&quot;, explored in many technical papers and a great
non-technical essay (below).  This leads to a kind of social contract: we all
agree to wallop the first guy to wallop anyone else.  They would go further,
and add a clause about agreeing to help each other out, until we catch someone
cheating, at which point we wallop them, too.

&lt;P&gt;Nice if we can get it to work; but why should we &lt;em&gt;want&lt;/em&gt; to say, go
out of our way to punish cheaters?  Why should we want to cooperate?  Clearly,
we need some emotion which pushes us in that direction; to steal a useful
phrase from Adam Smith, moral sentiments.  Why should &lt;em&gt;those&lt;/em&gt; evolve?
Part of the answer, to my mind, comes from the work of Robert Frank, who
showed, pretty convincingly, that sentiments like loyalty, honesty, love, and,
yes, vengence have important material functions.  They provide solutions to
coordination and commitment problems, which make certain kinds of profitable
undertaking possible in the first place.  But they only do this if they are
&lt;em&gt;compelling&lt;/em&gt; (so you can't back out), and they are hard to fake.  There
is still a puzzle about how they could have evolved in the first place, but
that's much more tractable.

&lt;P&gt;Two biological questions suggest themselves.  One is how the moral
sentiments are implemented in the body, which they plainly are.  It is
conceivable that some people are physically incapable of &lt;em&gt;feeling&lt;/em&gt; moral
sentiments; it would be interesting to revisit brain-lesion studies in &lt;a
href=&quot;neuropsychology.html&quot;&gt;neuropsychology&lt;/a&gt; with this in mind.  The other
biological question is the evolution of the moral sentiments, and more
particularly the evolution of dispositions to learn certain sorts of morality.
(Whatever physical basis they have, it is plainly very flexible.)  There are
obvious free-rider problems here, as I said, but not insoluble ones.

&lt;P&gt;(Incidentally, I find it vastly amusing that people like Bowles and Gintis,
who are personally very nice and politically very perfect gentle bleeding
hearts, find themselves arguing for things like egalitarianism and reciprocity
on the grounds that people &lt;em&gt;like&lt;/em&gt; to pull down those who are high and
mighty and oppressive.  This is, after all, pure &lt;a
href=&quot;nietzsche.html&quot;&gt;Nietzsche&lt;/a&gt;, only with all his values transvalued.  But
if that's a dominating strategy, will-to-power considerations themselves tell
us to adopt it...)

&lt;P&gt;Some people object to this kind of explanation of ethics on the grounds that
it cheapens ethical behavior and the nobler emotions.  Indeed, some go so far
as to make the Nietzschean syllogism &quot;This offends my pride in my own
morality; &lt;em&gt;therefore&lt;/em&gt; it is false.&quot;  (I have heard this done by
Buddhists.)  More serious is the objection that, even if it is true, it is
impossible to belief it and act morally, virtuously, etc.  This seems dubious;
I can testify that it is possible to believe Frank's explanation of love and
still fall head-over-heels in love.

&lt;P&gt;Of course, none of this really solves the is-from-ought problem.  At best it
would show that ethics is a good strategy for material success, and we have
therefore evolved to find it admirable and attractive.  But maybe material
success is utterly, unspeakably vile, and our attraction to modes of behavior
which &lt;em&gt;look&lt;/em&gt; altruistic but have our interests secretly calculated into
them is not just vile but hypocritical.  Less Gnostically, since we know we
have inherited dispositions to make definite errors in logic, statistics,
visual perception, etc., it's hard to rule out the idea that we have inherited
dispositions towards finding the wrong sort of ethics attractive.

&lt;P&gt;Cf.
	&lt;a href=&quot;evol-psych.html&quot;&gt;Evolutionary Psychology&lt;/a&gt;;
	&lt;a href=&quot;social-neuroscience.html&quot;&gt;Social Neuroscience&lt;/a&gt;

&lt;ul&gt;Recommended:
	&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www-unix.oit.umass.edu/~gintis/&quot;&gt;Herbert
Gintis&lt;/a&gt;, &quot;Behavioral Ethics Meets Natural Justice&quot;,
&lt;cite&gt;Politics, Philosophy and Economics&lt;/cite&gt; forthcoming [Commentary on
Binmore's &lt;citE&gt;Natural
Justice&lt;/cite&gt;.  &lt;a
href=&quot;http://www.umass.edu/preferen/gintis/Binmore%20Critique.pdf&quot;&gt;PDF
preprint&lt;/a&gt;]
	&lt;li&gt;Raymond Boudon, &quot;The Sense of Values&quot; [&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.tf.uio.no/etikk/artikler/senseofvalues.htm&quot;&gt;Online&lt;/a&gt;.  Interesting comments on
&quot;naturalistic&quot; theories of values.]
	&lt;li&gt;Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, &quot;&lt;a
href=&quot;http://bostonreview.net/BR23.6/bowles.html&quot;&gt;Is Equality Pass&amp;eacute;?
&lt;em&gt;Homo reciprocans&lt;/em&gt; and the Future of Egalitarian Politics&lt;/a&gt;,&quot;
&lt;cite&gt;Boston Review&lt;/cite&gt; Dec. 1998
	&lt;li&gt;Jung-Kyoo Choi and Samuel Bowles, &quot;The Coevolution of Parochial
Altruism and
War&quot;, &lt;a href=&quot;http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.1144237&quot;&gt;&lt;cite&gt;Science&lt;/cite&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;318&lt;/strong&gt; (2007): 636--640&lt;/a&gt; [Lest one be tempted to take
&quot;altruism&quot;, in the biological sense, as an unambiguous ethical good]
	&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;dennett.html&quot;&gt;Daniel Dennett&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;cite&gt;Darwin's Dangerous
Idea&lt;/cite&gt;
	&lt;li&gt;Robert H. Frank, &lt;cite&gt;Passions within Reason: The Strategic Role
of the Emotions&lt;/cite&gt;
	&lt;li&gt;Thomas Huxley, &lt;cite&gt;Evolution and Ethics&lt;/cite&gt;
	&lt;li&gt;Ken MacLeod, &lt;cite&gt;The Cassini Division&lt;/cite&gt; [&lt;a
href=&quot;../reviews/cassini-division/&quot;&gt;Review: The True Knowledge vs. the Rapture
for Nerds&lt;/a&gt;]
	&lt;li&gt;Steven Pinker, &lt;cite&gt;How the Mind Works&lt;/cite&gt; [See esp. ch. 6,
&quot;Hotheads.&quot;  &lt;a href=&quot;../reviews/how-the-mind-works/&quot;&gt;Review: On Seeing the
Computational Forest for the Cultural Trees&lt;/a&gt;]
	&lt;li&gt;Janet Radcliffe Richards, &lt;cite&gt;Human Nature After Darwin&lt;/cite&gt;
	&lt;li&gt;Robert Wright, &lt;cite&gt;Nonzero: The Logic of Human Destiny&lt;/cite&gt;
[Ignoring the last third, about the meaning of life in general]
	&lt;/ul&gt;

&lt;ul&gt;To read:
	&lt;li&gt;Alexander, &lt;cite&gt;The Biology of Moral Systems&lt;/cite&gt;
	&lt;li&gt;J. McKenzie Alexander, &lt;cite&gt;The Structural Evolution of Morality&lt;/cite&gt; [&lt;a href=&quot;http://cambridge.org/ 9780521870320&quot;&gt;Blurb&lt;/a&gt;]
	&lt;li&gt;Robert Axelrod, &lt;cite&gt;The Evolution of Cooperation&lt;/cite&gt;
	&lt;li&gt;Ken Binmore
		&lt;ul&gt;
		&lt;li&gt;&lt;Cite&gt;Game Theory and the Social Contract&lt;/cite&gt; [2 vols]
		&lt;li&gt;&lt;cite&gt;Natural Justice&lt;/cite&gt;
		&lt;li&gt;Review of Axelrod's &lt;cite&gt;The Complexity of Cooperation&lt;/cite&gt;, &lt;cite&gt;Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation&lt;/citE&gt; &lt;strong&gt;1:1&lt;/strong&gt; [&lt;a href=&quot;http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/1/1/review1.html&quot;&gt;Link&lt;/a&gt;]
		&lt;/ul&gt;
	&lt;li&gt;Simon Blackburn, &lt;cite&gt;Ruling Passions&lt;/cite&gt;
	&lt;li&gt;John Bolender, &quot;The Genealogy of the Moral Modules&quot;, &lt;cite&gt;Minds
and Machines&lt;/cite&gt; &lt;strong&gt;13&lt;/strong&gt; (2003): 233--255
	&lt;li&gt;William D. Casebeer, &lt;cite&gt;Natural Ethical Facts: Evolution,
Connectionism, and Moral Cognition&lt;/cite&gt;
	&lt;li&gt;J.-P. Changeux, &lt;cite&gt;The Physiology of Truth: Neuroscience and
Human Knowledge&lt;/cite&gt; [&lt;a
href=&quot;http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog/CHAPHT.html&quot;&gt;Blurb&lt;/a&gt;]
	&lt;li&gt;Karen A. Cerulo, &lt;cite&gt;Deciphering Violence: The Cognitive
Structure of Right and Wrong&lt;/cite&gt;
	&lt;li&gt;D. Darcet and D. Sornette, &quot;Emergence of human cooperation and
altruism by evolutionary feedback
selection&quot;, &lt;a href=&quot;http://arxiv.org/abs/physics/0610225&quot;&gt;physics/0610225&lt;/a&gt;
	&lt;l&gt;Christopher T. Dawes, James H. Fowler, Tim Johnson, Richard
McElreath and Oleg Smirnov, &quot;Egalitarian motives in humans&quot;,
&lt;a href=&quot;http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/nature05651&quot;&gt;&lt;citE&gt;Nature&lt;/cite&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;446&lt;/strong&gt; (2007): 794--796&lt;/a&gt;
	&lt;li&gt;Frans de Waal, &lt;cite&gt;Primates and Philosophers: How Morality
Evolved&lt;/cite&gt;
	&lt;li&gt;Lee A. Dugatkin
		&lt;ul&gt;
		&lt;li&gt;&lt;cite&gt;Cheating Monkeys and Citizen Bees: The
Nature of Cooperation in Animals and Humans&lt;/cite&gt;
		&lt;li&gt;&lt;cite&gt;The Altruism Equation: Seven Scientists Search for
the Origins of Goodness&lt;/cite&gt; [&lt;a
href=&quot;http://www.pupress.princeton.edu/titles/8239.html&quot;&gt;Blurb&lt;/a&gt;]
		&lt;/ul&gt;
	&lt;li&gt;Paul Lawrence Farber, &lt;cite&gt;The Temptations of Evolutionary
Ethics&lt;/cite&gt; [&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.escholarship.org/editions/view?docId=ft5779p06t&quot;&gt;Free online&lt;/a&gt;]
	&lt;li&gt;Ernst Fehr and Urs Fischbacher, &quot;Social norms and human
cooperation&quot;, &lt;a
href=&quot;http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2004.02.007&quot;&gt;&lt;cite&gt;Trends in Cognitive
Sciences&lt;/cite&gt; &lt;strong&gt;8&lt;/strong&gt; (2004): 185--190&lt;/a&gt;
	&lt;li&gt;Ernst Fehr and Bettina Rockenbach, &quot;Detrimental effects of
sanctions on human altruism,&quot; &lt;a
href=&quot;http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.1038/nature01474&quot;&gt;&lt;cite&gt;Nature&lt;/cite&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;422&lt;/strong&gt; (2003): 137--140&lt;/a&gt;
	&lt;li&gt;Alexander Field, &lt;cite&gt;Altruistically Inclined? The Behavioral
Sciences, Evolutionary Theory, and the Origins of Reciprocity&lt;/cite&gt;
	&lt;li&gt;John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza, S. J., &lt;cite&gt;Responsibility
and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility&lt;/cite&gt; [&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.cambridge.org/0521775795&quot;&gt;Blurb&lt;/a&gt;]
	&lt;li&gt;Robert H. Frank, &lt;cite&gt;What Price the Moral High Ground?  Ethical
Dilemmas in Competitive Environments&lt;/cite&gt; [&lt;a
href=&quot;http://pup.princeton.edu/chapters/s7602.html&quot;&gt;Chapter 1&lt;/a&gt;]
	&lt;li&gt;Norman Frolich and
&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/oppenheimer/&quot;&gt;Joe A. Oppenheimer&lt;/a&gt;,
&lt;cite&gt;Choosing Justice: An Experimental Approach to Ethical Theory&lt;/cite&gt;
[&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.escholarship.org/editions/view?docId=ft3f59n88z&quot;&gt;Free online&lt;/a&gt;]
	&lt;li&gt;Bernard Gert, &lt;cite&gt;Common Morality : Deciding What To Do&lt;/cite&gt;
	&lt;li&gt;Walter Glannon (ed.), &lt;cite&gt;Defining Right and Wrong in Brain
Science: Essential Readings in Neuroethics&lt;/cite&gt;
[&lt;a
href=&quot;http://www.press.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/hfs.cgi/00/225768.ctl&quot;&gt;Blurb&lt;/a&gt;]
	&lt;li&gt;Jeffrey Goldberg, Livia Markoczy and G. Lawrence Zahn, &quot;Symmetry
and the Illusion of Control as Bases for Cooperative Behavior&quot;,
&lt;a href=&quot;http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1043463105055431&quot;&gt;&lt;cite&gt;Rationality
and Society&lt;/cite&gt; &lt;strong&gt;17&lt;/strong&gt; (2005): 243--270&lt;/a&gt; [I should
probably just start a collective-action notebook, since this is really
stretching things...]
	&lt;li&gt;Leonard D. Katz (ed.), &lt;cite&gt;The Evolutionary Origins of Morality:
Cross-Disciplinary Perspectives&lt;/cite&gt; [Blurbed by &lt;a
href=&quot;chomsky.html&quot;&gt;Chomsky&lt;/a&gt;, of all people]
	&lt;li&gt;Jorge Moll, Frank Krueger, Roland Zahn, Matteo Pardini, Ricardo de
Oliveira-Souza, and Jordan Grafman, &quot;Human fronto-mesolimbic networks guide
decisions about charitable
donation&quot;, &lt;a
href=&quot;http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0604475103&quot;&gt;&lt;cite&gt;Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences&lt;/cite&gt; (USA) &lt;strong&gt;103&lt;/strong&gt; (2006):
15623--15628&lt;/a&gt;
	&lt;li&gt;Shaun Nichols, &lt;cite&gt;Sentimental Rules: On the Natural Foundations of Moral Judgment&lt;/cite&gt;
	&lt;li&gt;John Orbell, Tomonori Morikawa, Jason Hartwig, James Hanley and
Nicholas Allen, &quot;'Machiavellian' Intelligence as a Basis for the
Evolution of Cooperative Dispositions&quot;, &lt;cite&gt;American Political Science
Review&lt;/cite&gt; &lt;strong&gt;98&lt;/strong&gt; (2004): 1--15
	&lt;li&gt;Alvin E. Roth, &quot;Repugnance as a Constraint on Markets&quot;,
&lt;cite&gt;Journal of Economic Perspectives&lt;/cite&gt; forthcoming (2007)
[&lt;a href=&quot;http://kuznets.fas.harvard.edu/~aroth/papers/Repugnance.pdf&quot;&gt;PDF&lt;/a&gt;
preprint.  Thanks to reader Nicolas D. P. for pointing this out to me.]
	&lt;li&gt;William A. Rottschaefer, &lt;cite&gt;The Biology and Psychology of Moral
Agency&lt;/cite&gt; [&lt;a
href=&quot;http://www.cup.org/Titles/59/0521592658.html&quot;&gt;Blurb&lt;/a&gt;]
	&lt;li&gt;Angel Sanchez and Jose A. Cuesta, &quot;Altrusim may arise from
individual selection&quot;, &lt;a
href=&quot;http://arxiv.org/abs/q-bio.PE/0403023&quot;&gt;q-bio.PE/0403023&lt;/a&gt;
	&lt;li&gt;Richard Schuster and Amir Perelberg, &quot;Why cooperate?  An economic
perspective is not enough&quot;, &lt;a
href=&quot;http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&amp;db=pubmed&amp;dopt=Abstract&amp;list_uids=15157976&quot;&gt;&lt;cite&gt;Behavioural
Processes&lt;/cite&gt; &lt;strong&gt;66&lt;/strong&gt; (2004): 261--277&lt;/a&gt; [Thanks to &lt;a
href=&quot;http://www.science.ethomson.net/&quot;&gt;Eric Thomson&lt;/a&gt; for alerting me to
this]
	&lt;li&gt;Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), &lt;cite&gt;Moral Psychology&lt;/citE&gt;
		&lt;ol&gt;
		&lt;li&gt;&lt;cite&gt;The Evolution of Morality: Adaptations and
Innateness&lt;/cite&gt;
[&lt;a href=&quot;http://mitpress.mit.edu/978-0-262-69354-7&quot;&gt;blurb&lt;/a&gt;]
		&lt;li&gt;&lt;cite&gt;The Cognitive Science of Morality: Intuition and
Diversity&lt;/cite&gt;
[&lt;a href=&quot;http://mitpress.mit.edu/978-0-262-69357-8&quot;&gt;blurb&lt;/a&gt;]
		&lt;li&gt;&lt;cite&gt;The Neuroscience of Morality: Emotion, Brain
Disorders, and Development&lt;/cite&gt;
[&lt;a href=&quot;http://mitpress.mit.edu/978-0-262-69355-4&quot;&gt;blurb&lt;/a&gt;]
		&lt;/ol&gt;
	&lt;li&gt;Brian Skyrms
		&lt;ul&gt;
		&lt;li&gt;&lt;cite&gt;The Evolution of the Social Contract&lt;/cite&gt;
		&lt;li&gt;&lt;cite&gt;The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social
Structure&lt;/cite&gt;
		&lt;/ul&gt;
	&lt;li&gt;Adam Smith, &lt;citE&gt;Theory of the Moral Sentiments&lt;/cite&gt;
	&lt;li&gt;Ervin Staub, &lt;cite&gt;The Psychology of Good and Evil: Why Children, Adults, and Groups Help and Harm Others&lt;/cite&gt;
	&lt;li&gt;Richard Tuck, &lt;citE&gt;Free Riding&lt;/cite&gt;
[&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog/TUCFRE.html&quot;&gt;blurb, excerpts&lt;/a&gt;]
	&lt;li&gt;Tom R. Tyler, &lt;cite&gt;Why People Obey the Law&lt;/cite&gt;
[&lt;a href=&quot;http://pup.princeton.edu/titles/8230.html&quot;&gt;Blurb, afterword&lt;/a&gt;]
	&lt;li&gt;R. Vilela Mendes, &quot;Network Dependence of Strong Reciprocity&quot;,
&lt;a href=&quot;http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/S0219525904000226&quot;&gt;&lt;cite&gt;Advances in Complex
Systems&lt;/cite&gt; &lt;strong&gt;7&lt;/strong&gt; (2004): 357--368&lt;/a&gt;
	&lt;li&gt;James Q. Wilson, &lt;cite&gt;The Moral Sense&lt;/cite&gt;
	&lt;/ul&gt;
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