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    <title>Notebooks   </title>
    <link>http://bactra.org/notebooks</link>
    <description>Cosma's Notebooks</description>
    <language>en</language>

  <item>
    <title>Guerilla Warfare, Counter-Insurgency, etc.</title>
    <link>http://bactra.org/notebooks/2009/04/10#guerillas</link>
    <description>
&lt;P&gt;There is a strong overlap with &lt;a href=&quot;peasant-revolts.html&quot;&gt;peasant
revolts&lt;/A&gt;, but urban guerilla warfare is certainly possible, and increasingly
common...

&lt;P&gt;It would be interesting to know exactly how the romanticization of guerillas
among the inhabitants of rich, peaceful countries developed.

&lt;P&gt;See also:
	&lt;a href=&quot;afghanistan.html&quot;&gt;Afghanistan&lt;/a&gt;;
	&lt;a href=&quot;empires.html&quot;&gt;Empires and Imperialism&lt;/a&gt;;
	&lt;a href=&quot;intl-arms-trade.html&quot;&gt;International Arms Trade&lt;/a&gt;;
	&lt;a href=&quot;nationalism.html&quot;&gt;Nationalism&lt;/a&gt;;
	&lt;a href=&quot;revolution.html&quot;&gt;Revolution&lt;/a&gt;;
	&lt;a href=&quot;terrorism.html&quot;&gt;Terrorism&lt;/a&gt;;
	&lt;a href=&quot;war.html&quot;&gt;War&lt;/a&gt;


&lt;ul&gt;Recommended:
	&lt;li&gt;Thomas X. Hammes, &quot;Countering Evolved Insurgent
Networks&quot;, &lt;a
href=&quot;http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/JulAug06/Hammes.pdf&quot;&gt;&lt;cite&gt;Military
Review&lt;/cite&gt; July-August 2006: 18--26&lt;/a&gt; [&quot;Insurgency is a competition
between human networks. We must understand that salient fact before can we
develop and execute a plan to defeat the insurgents.&quot;]
	&lt;li&gt;Edward Luttwak, &quot;Dead End: Counterinsurgency warfare as military
malpractice&quot;, &lt;a
href=&quot;http://www.harpers.org/archive/2007/02/0081384&quot;&gt;&lt;cite&gt;Harper's&lt;/cite&gt;
(February 2007&lt;/a&gt;
	&lt;li&gt;Brian Reed, &quot;A Social Network Approach to Understanding an
Insurgency&quot;, &lt;a
href=&quot;http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/07summer/reed.htm&quot;&gt;&lt;citE&gt;Parameters&lt;/cite&gt;
(Summer 2007): 19--30&lt;/a&gt; [An odd mixture of some explanation of the basics
of &lt;a href=&quot;social-networks.html&quot;&gt;social network analysis&lt;/a&gt;, modern doctrine
on counter-insurgency, and highly debatable statements about the Global War on
Terrorism, which border on propaganda for a specific ideological
position.  &lt;a
href=&quot;http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/07summer/reed.pdf&quot;&gt;PDF&lt;/a&gt;]
	&lt;/ul&gt;


&lt;ul&gt;To read:
	&lt;li&gt;Ivan Arreguin-Toft, &lt;cite&gt;How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of
Asymmetric Conflict&lt;/cite&gt;
[&lt;a href=&quot;http://cambridge.org/0521839769&quot;&gt;Blurb&lt;/a&gt;. I remember finding a very
interesting-sounding critique of this, one the grounds that the situations
described were better thought of as sensibly concluding that some wars were not
worth fighting in the first place, but cannot now find it again.]
	&lt;li&gt;Clifford Bob, &lt;cite&gt;The Marketing of Rebellion: Insurgents, Media,
and International Acticvism&lt;/cite&gt; [From
the &lt;a href=&quot;http://cambridge.org/0521607868&quot;&gt;blurb&lt;/a&gt;: &quot;How do a few
Third World political movements become global &lt;em&gt;causes celebres&lt;/em&gt;, while
most remain isolated? This book rejects dominant views that needy groups
readily gain help from selfless nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Instead,
they face a Darwinian struggle for scarce resources where support goes to the
savviest, not the neediest. Examining Mexico's Zapatista rebels and Nigeria's
Ogoni ethnic group, the book draws critical conclusions about social movements,
NGOs, and 'global civil society'.&quot;]
	&lt;li&gt;Jason Lyall and Isaiah Wilson III, &quot;Rage Against the Machines:
Mechanization and the Determinants of Victory in Counterinsurgency Warfare&quot;
[&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.princeton.edu/~jlyall/Rage2.3.pdf&quot;&gt;PDF preprint&lt;/a&gt;.
Their thesis is that mechanization, as such, makes modern powers increasingly
unable to deal with insurgencies successfully.  (One might, though on a quick
scan they don't, connect this in turn to the &quot;cost disease&quot; afflicting many
human-service industries in advanced economies, that technological progress
makes labor increasingly expensive, by raising productivity in most sectors of
the economy, but does not raise productivity in &lt;em&gt;those&lt;/em&gt; industries.)
It's an interesting idea, but the obvious confounding factors are the spread of
modern forms of political organization based
on &lt;a href=&quot;nationalism.html&quot;&gt;nationalism&lt;/a&gt; and &lt;a href=&quot;literacy.html&quot;&gt;mass
literacy&lt;/a&gt;, along with the spread of small arms; and this is an old
diagnosis, going back to at least Raymond Aron in the early 1960s.  (&quot;Is it
coincidence, comrades&quot;, that several flags now incorporate the Kalashnikov?)
I'm curious to see how they argue against this.  Found via some blog or other,
but cannot now reconstruct which.]
	&lt;li&gt;T. David Mason, &lt;cite&gt;Caught in the Crossfire: Revolutions,
Repression, and the Rational Peasant&lt;/cite&gt;
	&lt;li&gt;Nagl, &lt;cite&gt;Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife&lt;/cite&gt;
	&lt;li&gt;Douglas A. Ollivant and Eric D. Chewning, &quot;Producing Victory:
Rethinking Conventional Forces in COIN Operations&quot;, &lt;a
href=&quot;http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/JulAug06/Ollivant-Chewning.pdf&quot;&gt;&lt;cite&gt;Military
Review&lt;/cite&gt; July-August 2006: 50--59&lt;/a&gt; [&quot;The combined arms maneuver
battalion, partnering with indigenous security forces and living among the
population it secures, should be the basic tactical unit of counterinsurgency
(COIN) warfare.&quot;]
	&lt;li&gt;Edward E. Rice, &lt;cite&gt;Wars of the Third Kind: Conflict in
Underdeveloped Countries&lt;/cite&gt; [&lt;a
href=&quot;http://ark.cdlib.org/ark:/13030/ft6c6006rm&quot;&gt;Online&lt;/a&gt;]
	&lt;li&gt;D. Michael Shafer, &lt;cite&gt;Deadly Paradigms: The Failure of U.S.
Counterinsurgency Policy&lt;/cite&gt;
	&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.sinno.com/&quot;&gt;Abdulkader
H. Sinno&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;cite&gt;Organizations at War in Afghanistan and Beyond&lt;/cite&gt;
[&lt;a
href=&quot;http://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/cup_detail.taf?ti_id=4778&quot;&gt;Blurb&lt;/a&gt;;
&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.sinno.com/book.htm&quot;&gt;author's book description&lt;/a&gt;]
	&lt;li&gt;Paul T. Stanton, &quot;Unit Immersion in Mosul: Establishing Stability in
Transition&quot;, &lt;a
href=&quot;http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/JulAug06/Stanton.pdf&quot;&gt;&lt;cite&gt;Military
Review&lt;/cite&gt; July-August 2006: 60--70&lt;/a&gt; [&quot;Tactical units living and working
with the population provide the flexibility to gather and disseminate
information, influence host-nation political development, and neutralize threat
activity.&quot;]
	&lt;li&gt;Vo Nguyen Giap, &lt;cite&gt;The Military Art of People's War&lt;/cite&gt;
	&lt;li&gt;Jeremy M. Weinstein, &lt;cite&gt;Inside Rebellion: The Politics of
Insurgent Violence&lt;/cite&gt; [&lt;a href=&quot;http://cambridge.org/0521677971&quot;&gt;blurb&lt;/a&gt;]
	&lt;/ul&gt;
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