Institutions and Organizations

01 Mar 2008 17:04

---

Institutions keep society from falling apart, provided that there is something to keep institutions from falling apart.
---Jon Elster, Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences, ch. 15

Institutional economics (old-style à la Commons; neo-institutional à la Douglass North; new institutional à la Williamson). Empirical studies of different sorts of economic institutions. Industrial organization and market structure (institutions beyond the bounds of any one formal organization). Organization theory. Theories of institutional change, formation. Difference between institutions which are products of policy and those which are products of custom. (Intermediate cases abound naturally.) Evolutionary economics. Memes. Institutional design. Centralized vs. decentralized institutions. Corruption. Distribution of power vs. formal organization. History of bureaucracy and other sorts of formal organization. (Did Europeans take civil service exams from China? How did they evolve in China?) Game-theoretic approaches. Simulations. Spontaneous formation of institutions. How, exactly, do "institutions matter" in economic development and growth? Why do the contributions from economics seem so much more convincing than those from sociology?

See also: Collective Action; Collective Cognition; Networks of Political Actors; Political Decision Making

Recommended:
• Kenneth Arrow
  • Social Choice and Individual Values
  • The Limits of Organization
• F. G. Bailey, Humbuggery and Manipulation: The Art of Leadership
• James Beniger, The Control Revolution: Technological and Economic Origins of the Information Society [Review]
• Samuel Bowles, Microeconomics: Behavior, Institutions, and Evolution
• Colin Crouch and Henry Farrell, "Breaking the Path of Institutional Development? Alternatives to the New Determinism", Rationality and Society 16 (2004): 5--43
• R. A. Dahl and C. E. Lindblom, Politics, Economics and Welfare: Planning and Politico-Economic Systems Resolved into Basic Social Processes
• Jerker Denrell, "Radical Organization Theory: An Incomplete Contract Approach to Power and Organizational Design", Rationality and Society12 (2000): 39--66 [Commentary elsewhere]
• Thráinn Eggertsson, Economic Behavior and Institutions [Review: Homo economicus on the Grand Tour, or, When Is a Lizard a Good Enough Dragon for Government Work?]
• Henry Farrell and Jack Knight, "Trust and Institutional Compliance" [Thanks to Henry for a preprint]
• John Kenneth Galbraith, The New Industrial State
• Bennett Harrison, Lean and Mean [As an example of how to analyze a particular set of institutions and formal organizations]
• F. A. Hayek, "Use of Knowledge in Society" and "Economics and Knowledge" in Individualism and Economic Order
• Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty
• Rakesh Khurana, Searching for a Corporate Savior: The Irrational Quest for Charismatic CEOs
• James March and Herbert Simon, Organizations
• Gary J. Miller, Managerial Dilemmas: The Political Economy of Hierarchy [Review by Stephen Laniel]
• Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action [How groups work, and why volunteerism is almost never sufficient to secure public goods. (Short version: if it's a public good, i.e. one from which everyone benefits without exclusion, why should you put yourself out to secure it? Surely somebody else will... Olson provides a detailed economic analysis to flesh this out.) How interest groups work, why people won't show up to union meetings but will overwhelmingly vote to make union membership compulsory, taxes and government, the weakness of large classes, etc., etc. Brilliant.]
• Thomas Schelling, Micromotives and Macrobehavior
• Herbert Simon, "Organizations and Markets," Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5 (1991) 25--44 [Collected in Models of Bounded Rationality, vol. III; see also ch. 2 of his Sciences of the Artificial]
• H. Preyton Young, Individual Strategy and Social Structure: An Evolutionary Theory of Institutions [Review: A Myopic (and Sometimes Blind) Eye on the Main Chance, or, the Origins of Custom]

To read:
• Howard Aldrich, Organizations Evolving
• Masahiko Aoki, Toward a Comparative Institutional Analysis [Blurb]
• G. C. Archibald, Information, Incentives and the Economics of Control ["examines methods for controlling or guiding a sector of the economy that do not require all the apparatus of economic planning or rely on the vain hope of sufficiently 'perfect' competition, but instead rely entirely on the self-interest of economic agents and voluntary contract. The methods involved require trial-and-error steps in real time, with the target adjusted as the results of each step become known." Full blurb]
• A. Baronchelli, L. Dall'Asta, A. Barrat, V. Loreto, "Non-equilibrium phase transition in negotiation dynamics", cond-mat/0611717
• Lee Roy Beach, The Psychology of Decision Making: People in Organizations
• Yochai Benkler, "Coase's Penguin, or Linux and the Nature of the Firm," cs.CY/0109077
• Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, "The Evolutionary Basis of Collective Action", forthcoming in the Oxford Handbook of Political Economy [PDF preprint]
• Ori Brafman and Rod Beckstrom, The Starfish and the Spider: The Unstoppable Power of Leaderless Organizations [sounds dubious, but worth looking at]
• David Braybrooke (ed.), Social Rules: Origin; Character; Logic; Change [Blurb]
• Daniel W. Bromley, Sufficient Reason: Volitional Pragmatism and the Meaning of Economic Institutions [Blurb, ch. 1]
• Francesca Cancian, What Are Norms?
• Dan Carpenter, "Adaptive Signal Processing, Hierarchy, and Budgetary Control in Federal Regulation", American Political Science Review 90 (1996): 283--302
• Glenn R. Carroll and Michael T. Hannan, The Demography of Corporations and Industries
• Alfred Chandler
  • The Visible Hand
  • Scale and Scope
  • Strategy and Structure
• David Chisholm, Coordination without Hierarchy: Informal Structures in Multiorganizational Systems [Blurb]
• John Commons, Institutional Economics: Its Place in Political Economy
• Alex Cooley, Logics of Hierarchy: The Organization of Empires, States and Military Occupations [Blurb]
• Barbara Czarniawska, Narrating the Organization: Dramas of Institutional Identity
• Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell, "The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields", American Sociological Review 48 (1983): 147--160 ["Once a set of organizations emerges as a field, a paradox arises: rational actors make their organizations increasingly similar as they try to change them." JSTOR. "Isomorphism" seems like the wrong word.]
• Avinash K. Dixit, Lawlessness and Economics: Alternative Modes of Governance
• Tom Douglas, Change, Intervention and Consequence: An Exploration of the Process of Intended Change
• Robert Edgerton, Rules, Exceptions and Social Order
• Thrainn Eggertsson, Imperfect Institutions: Possibilities and Limits of Reform
• Jon Elster, Clauss Offe and Ulrich K. Preuss, Institutional Design in Post-communist Societies: Rebuilding the Ship at Sea
• Robert C. Feenstra and Gordon H. Hanson, "Ownership and Control in Outsourcing to China: Estimating the Property-Rights Theory of the Firm", The Quarterly Journal of Economics 120 (2005): 729--761
• N. Fligstein, "Fields, Power and Social Skill: Critical Analysis of the New Institutionalisms"[PDF]
• Diego Gambetta, The Sicilian Mafia: The Business of Private Protection
• Robert E. Goodin (ed.), The Theory of Institutional Design
• Avner Greif, Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons from Medieval Trade [Full text of a draft available as a series of single-chapter PDFs]
• Judith Gruber, Controlling Bureaucracies: Dilemmas in Democratic Governance [online]
• Michael T. Hannan and John Freeman, Organizational Ecology
• J. Richard Harrison and Glenn R. Carroll, Culture and Demography in Organizations [Blurb, ch. 1]
• Bryan D. Jones, Politics and the Architecture of Choice
• Eric L. Jones, Cultures Merging: A Historical and Economic Critique of Culture [Blurb]
• Robert Klitgaard, Controlling Corruption
• Jack Knight, Institutions and Social Conflict
• Ken Kollman, John Miller and Scott Page (eds.), Computational Models in Political Economy [Always a good idea to read your boss's books]
• Neil Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives: Choosing Institutions in Law, Economics and Public Policy [Blurb]
• Jack H. Knott and Gary J. Miller, Reforming Bureaucracy: The Politics of Institutional Choice
• George Krause and Kennth Meier (eds.), Politics, Policy, and Organizations: Frontiers in the Scientific Study of Bureaucracy
• L. M. Lachmann, The Legacy of Max Weber: Three Essays [PDF. Recommended by Tyler Cowen.]
• Lazonick, Business Organization and the Myth of the Market Economy
• Youngki Lee, Luís A. Nunes Amaral, David Canning, Martin Meyer and H. Eugene Stanley, "Universal Features in the Growth Dynamics of Complex Organizations," cond-mat/9804100
• Yi-min Lin, Between Politics and Markets: Firms, Competition, and Institutional Change in Post-Mao China [Blurb]
• C. Mantzavinos, Individuals, Institutions, and Markets
• C. Mantzavinos, Douglass C. North and Syed Shariq, "Learning, Institutions, and Economic Performance", Perspectives on Politics 2 (2004): 75--84
• Jerry Mashaw, Greed, Chaos and Governance
• Cathleen McGrath and David Krackhardt, "Network Conditions for Organizational Change", The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science 39 (2003): 324--336 [PDF reprint]
• John McMillan, Reinventing the Bazaar: The Natural History of Markets
• Max Neiman, Defending Government: Why Big Government Works
• Daniel B. Neill, "Cascade Effects in Heterogeneous Populations", Rationality and Society 17 (2005): 191--241 ["model of sequential choice which explains the emergence and persistence of unpopular, inefficient behavioral norms in society. We model individuals as naive Bayesian norm followers, rational agents whose subjective expected utility is increased by adherence to an established norm. Agents use Bayesian reasoning to combine their private preferences and prior beliefs with empirical observations of others' decisions. When agents must infer the preferences of others from observation, this can result in negative cascades, causing the majority of agents to choose a dispreferred action (because they believe, incorrectly, that they are following the majority preference). We demonstrate that negative cascades can result even when the degree of conformity is relatively low, and under a wide range of conditions (including heterogeneity in preferences, priors, and impact of public opinion)"]
• Douglass North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance
• Joe Oppenheimer
• Elinor Ostrom
  • Understanding Institutional Diversity in Open Societies [partial online draft]
  • Governing the Commons
• Ostrom, Gardner and Walker, Rules, Games and Common-Pool Resources
• Elinor Ostrom and Harini Nagendra, "Insights on linking forests, trees, and people from the air, on the ground, and in the laboratory", Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (USA) 103 (2006): 19224--19231
• Scott Page, "Uncertainty, Difficulty, and Complexity" SFI Working Paper 98-08-076
• Charles Perrow
  • Normal Accidents
  • Organizing America: Wealth, Power, and the Origins of Corporate Capitalism
• Paul Pierson, Politics in Time: History, Institutions and Social Analysis
• Adam Przeworksi, "The Last Instance: Are Institutions the Primary Cause of Economic Development?", European Journal of Sociology 45 (2004): 165--188 ["neo-institutionalists claim that institutions are the 'primary' cause of economic development, 'deeper' than the supply of factors and methods for their use, which Marxists would call 'forces of production'. Yet while the conclusion is different, the historical narratives differ little across these perspectives. How, then, are such conclusions derived? Can anything be said to be 'primary'? I conclude that 'causal primacy' is an answer to an incorrectly posed question. Institutions and development are mutually endogenous and the most we can hope for is to identify their reciprocal impacts."]
• Prietula, Carley and Gasser (eds.), Simulating Organizations
• John E. Roemer, Political Competition: Theory and Applications [Blurb]
• Steven Rosefielde, Comparative Economic Systems: Culture, Wealth, and Power in the 21st Century ["Explains how culture, in various guises, modifies the standard rules of economic engagement, creating systems that differ markedly from those predicted by the theory of general market competition."]
• Michael Rowlinson, Organisations and Institutions: Perspectives in Economics and Sociology
• Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Power and the Division of Labor
• Ekkehart Schlicht, "Social Evolution, Corporate Culture, and Exploitation" [online]
• Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny, The Grabbing Hand: Government Pathologies and Their Cures
• Herbert Simon, Administrative Behavior
• Abdulkader H. Sinno, Organizations at War in Afghanistan and Beyond [Blurb; author's book description]
• Daniel Spulber, Market Microstructure: Intermediaries and the Theory of the Firm
• Arthur Stinchcombe, Information and Organizations
• Joshua R. Tyler, Dennis M. Wilkinson and Bernardo A. Huberman, "Email as Spectroscopy: Automated Discovery of Community Structure within Organizations," cond-mat/0303264
• Viktor J. Vanberg, "Rational Choice vs. Program-Based Behavior: Alternative Theoretical Approaches and Their Relevance for the Study of Institutions", Rationality and Society 14 (2002): 7--54
• Thorstein Veblen
  • Theory of the Leisure Class
  • Theory of Business Enterprise
  • Higher Learning in America
  • "Why Is Economics Not an Evolutionary Science?"
• Harrison White, Markets from Networks: Socioeconomic Models of Production
• Oliver Williamson
  • Markets and Hierarchies
  • Mechanisms of Governance