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  <channel>
    <title>Notebooks   </title>
    <link>http://bactra.org/notebooks</link>
    <description>Cosma's Notebooks</description>
    <language>en</language>

  <item>
    <title>Judgment, Choice, Human Decision-Making</title>
    <link>http://bactra.org/notebooks/2009/04/10#judgment</link>
    <description>


&lt;P&gt;See also:
	&lt;a href=&quot;ai.html&quot;&gt;Artificial Intelligence&lt;/a&gt;;
	&lt;a href=&quot;ai-and-folly.html&quot;&gt;Artificial Intelligence and Natural Folly&lt;/a&gt;;
	&lt;a href=&quot;cognitive-science.html&quot;&gt;Cognitive Science&lt;/a&gt;;
	&lt;a href=&quot;clinical-vs-actuarial.html&quot;&gt;Clinical versus Actuarial Judgment&lt;/a&gt;;
	&lt;a href=&quot;evol-psych.html&quot;&gt;Evolutionary Psychology&lt;/a&gt;;
	&lt;a href=&quot;institutions.html&quot;&gt;Institutions and Organizations&lt;/a&gt;;
	&lt;a href=&quot;learning-inference-induction.html&quot;&gt;Machine Learning, Statistical
Inference and Induction&lt;/a&gt;;
	&lt;a href=&quot;management.html&quot;&gt;Management&lt;/a&gt;;
	&lt;a href=&quot;neuropsychology.html&quot;&gt;Neuropsychology&lt;/a&gt;;
	&lt;a href=&quot;political-decision-making.html&quot;&gt;Political Decision-Making&lt;/a&gt;;
	&lt;a href=&quot;statistics.html&quot;&gt;Statistics&lt;/a&gt;


&lt;ul&gt;Recommended:
	&lt;li&gt;Colin Camerer, &quot;Individual Decision Making&quot;, in Kagel and Roth
	&lt;li&gt;Leda Cosmides and John Tooby, &quot;Are Humans Good Intuitive
Statisticians After All? Rethinking Some Conclusions from the Literature on
Judgement Under Uncertainity&quot;, &lt;cite&gt;Cognition&lt;/cite&gt; &lt;strong&gt;58&lt;/strong&gt;
(1996): 1--73 [Answer: yes, but only for frequentist statistical problems!]
	&lt;li&gt;Gerd Gigerenzer, &lt;cite&gt;Adaptive Thinking: Rationality in the
Real World&lt;/cite&gt;
	&lt;li&gt;Gerd Gigerenzer and Ulrich Hoffrage, &quot;How to Improve Bayesian
Reasoning without Instruction: Frequency Formats&quot;, &lt;cite&gt;Psychological
Review&lt;/cite&gt; &lt;strong&gt;102&lt;/strong&gt; (1995): 684--704
[&lt;a href=&quot;http://library.mpib-berlin.mpg.de/ft/gg/GG_How_1995.pdf&quot;&gt;PDF
reprint&lt;/a&gt;]
	&lt;li&gt;Gerd Gigerenzer and Peter M. Todd (eds.), &lt;cite&gt;Simple Heuristics
That Make Us Smart&lt;/cite&gt;
	&lt;li&gt;John H. Kagel and Alvin E. Roth (eds.), &lt;cite&gt;The Handbook of
Experimental Economics&lt;/cite&gt;
	&lt;li&gt;Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky (eds.), &lt;cite&gt;Judgement under
Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases&lt;/cite&gt;
	&lt;li&gt;Ariel Rubinstein, &lt;cite&gt;Modeling Bounded Rationality&lt;/cite&gt; [&lt;a
href=&quot;../reviews/modeling-bounded-rationality/&quot;&gt;Review&lt;/a&gt;]
	&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;simon.html&quot;&gt;Herbert Simon&lt;/a&gt;
		&lt;ul&gt;
		&lt;li&gt;&quot;A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice&quot;, &lt;cite&gt;Quarterly
Journal of Economics&lt;/cite&gt; &lt;strong&gt;69&lt;/strong&gt; (1955): 99--118 [&lt;a
href=&quot;http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/P/cp/p00b/p0098.pdf&quot;&gt;PDF&lt;/a&gt;]
		&lt;li&gt;&lt;cite&gt;Models of Bounded Rationality&lt;/cite&gt;, vols. I--III
		&lt;/ul&gt;
	&lt;/ul&gt;



&lt;ul&gt;To read:
	&lt;li&gt;George Ainslie, &lt;cite&gt;The Breakdown of Will&lt;/cite&gt;
[&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.cambridge.org/0521596947&quot;&gt;Blurb&lt;/a&gt;]
	&lt;li&gt;Beach, &lt;cite&gt;The Psychology of Decision Making&lt;/cite&gt;
	&lt;li&gt;Jonathan Bendor, Sunil Kumar
and &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.stanford.edu/~dasiegel/&quot;&gt;David A. Siegel&lt;/a&gt;,
&quot;Satisficing: A &lt;em&gt;Pretty&lt;/em&gt; Good Heuristic&quot;
[&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.stanford.edu/~dasiegel/satisficing--ident.pdf&quot;&gt;PDF
preprint&lt;/a&gt;.  From the abstract: &quot;[L]ittle work to date has been done in
nailing down the long- and medium-run implications of satisficing. ...  [W]e
show that satisficing does not automatically guide decision makers to optimal
strategies even in the long-run. ...  [S]atisficing does produce reasonable and
intuitive behavior over all time scales in many situations, including those in
which the path to optimization is unclear. We think the good news here
outweighs the bad; hence satisficing earns the label of a 'pretty good'
heuristic.&quot;]
	&lt;li&gt;Seth Bullock and Peter M. Todd, &quot;Made to Measure: Ecological
Rationality in Structured Environments&quot;, &lt;cite&gt;Minds and Machines&lt;/cite&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;9&lt;/strong&gt; (1999): 497--541
	&lt;li&gt;Colin F. Camerer, Teck-Hua Ho and Juin-Kuan Chong, &quot;A Cognitive
Hierarchy Model of Games&quot;, &lt;a
href=&quot;http://mitpress.mit.edu/catalog/item/default.asp?sid=93FB84B8-7FE5-438E-A779-980527305FBF&amp;ttype=6&amp;tid=13293&amp;mlid=329&quot;&gt;&lt;cite&gt;Quarterly
Journal of Economics&lt;/cite&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;119&lt;/strong&gt;: 861--898&lt;/a&gt; [Abstract: &quot;Players in a game are 'in
equilibrium' if they are rational, and accurately predict other players'
strategies. In many experiments, however, players are not in equilibrium. An
alternative is 'cognitive hierarchy' (CH) theory, where each player assumes
that his strategy is the most sophisticated. The CH model has inductively
defined strategic categories: step 0 players randomize; and step k thinkers
best-respond, assuming that other players are distributed over step 0 through
step k-1. This model fits empirical data, and explains why equilibrium theory
predicts behavior well in some games and poorly in others. An average of 1.5
steps fits data from many games.&quot;]
	&lt;li&gt;Terry Connolly, &quot;Action as a Fast and Frugal Heuristic&quot;,
&lt;cite&gt;Minds and Machines&lt;/cite&gt; &lt;strong&gt;9&lt;/strong&gt; (1999): 479--496
	&lt;li&gt;Nathaniel D. Daw, John P. O'Doherty, Peter Dayan, Ben Seymour and
Raymond J. Dolan, &quot;Cortical substrates for exploratory decisions in humans&quot;,
&lt;a
href=&quot;http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/nature04766&quot;&gt;&lt;cite&gt;Nature&lt;/cite&gt; &lt;strong&gt;441&lt;/strong&gt;
(2006): 876--879&lt;/a&gt;
	&lt;li&gt;Coralie de Hemptinne, Sylvie Nozaradan, Quentin Duvivier, Philippe
Lefevre, and Marcus Missal, &quot;How Do Primates Anticipate Uncertain Future
Events?&quot;,
&lt;a href=&quot;http://dx.doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.0388-07.2007&quot;&gt;&lt;cite&gt;Journal of
Neuroscience&lt;/cite&gt; &lt;strong&gt;27&lt;/strong&gt; (2007): 4334--4341&lt;/a&gt;
	&lt;li&gt;Jim Engle-Warnick, William J. McCausland and John H. Miller, &quot;The
Ghost in the Machine: Inferring Machine-Based Strategies from Observed
Behavior&quot;, working paper &lt;a
href=&quot;http://www.sceco.umontreal.ca/publications/etext/2004-11.pdf&quot;&gt;2004-11 of
the D&amp;eacute;partement de sciences &amp;eacute;nomiques, Universit&amp;eacute; de
Montr&amp;eacute;al&lt;/a&gt; [Thanks to John Miller for pointing this out to me!]
	&lt;li&gt;Estes, &lt;cite&gt;Classification and Cognition&lt;/cite&gt;
	&lt;li&gt;Gerg Gigerenzer and Christoph Engel, &lt;citE&gt;Heuristics and the
Law&lt;/cite&gt; [&lt;a href=&quot;http://mitpress.mit.edu/0-262-07275-0&quot;&gt;Blurb&lt;/a&gt;]
	&lt;li&gt;Gerg Gigerenzer and Reinhard Selten (eds.), &lt;cite&gt;Bounded
Rationality: The Adaptive Toolbox&lt;/cite&gt;
	&lt;li&gt;Thomas Gilovich, &lt;cite&gt;How We Know What Isn't So&lt;/cite&gt;
	&lt;li&gt;Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin and Daniel Kahneman (eds.),
&lt;citE&gt;Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment&lt;/cite&gt;
	&lt;li&gt;Paul W. Glimcher
		&lt;ul&gt;
		&lt;li&gt;&lt;cite&gt;Decisions, Uncertainty and the
Brain: The Science of Neuroeconomics&lt;/cite&gt;
		&lt;li&gt;&quot;The Neurobiology of Visual-Saccadic Decision Making&quot;,
&lt;a href=&quot;http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev.neuro.26.010302.081134&quot;&gt;&lt;citE&gt;Annual
Review of Neuroscience&lt;/cite&gt; &lt;strong&gt;26&lt;/strong&gt; (2003): 133--179&lt;/a&gt;
		&lt;/ul&gt;
	&lt;li&gt;Paul W. Glimcher and Aldo Rustichini, &quot;Neuroeconomics: The
Consilience of Brain and Decision&quot;, &lt;a
href=&quot;http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.1102566&quot;&gt;&lt;cite&gt;Science&lt;/cite&gt; &lt;strong&gt;306&lt;/strong&gt;
(2004): 447--452&lt;/a&gt;
	&lt;li&gt;Michael A. Goodrich, Wynn C. Stirling and Erwin R. Boer,
&quot;Satisficing Revisited&quot;, &lt;cite&gt;Minds and Machines&lt;/cite&gt; &lt;strong&gt;10&lt;/strong&gt;
(2000): 79--110
	  &lt;li&gt;Brit Grosskopf, Yoella Bereby-Meyer and Max Bazerman, &quot;On the Robustness of the Winner's Curse Phenomenon&quot;, &lt;cite&gt;Theory and Decision&lt;/cite&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;63&lt;/strong&gt; (2007): 389--418
[&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.people.hbs.edu/mbazerman/Papers/03-119-May31.pdf&quot;&gt;PDF
preprint&lt;/a&gt;.  &quot;We set out to find ways to help decision makers overcome the
'winner's curse,' a phenomenon commonly observed in asymmetric information
bargaining situations, and instead found strong support for its robustness.&quot;]
	&lt;li&gt;Kenneth R. Hammond, &lt;cite&gt;Judgments Under Stress&lt;/cite&gt;
	&lt;li&gt;David A. Hensher et al. &lt;cite&gt;Applied Choice Analysis: A
Primer&lt;/cite&gt; [&quot;Application of quantitative statistical methods to study
choices made by individuals. This primer provides an introduction to the main
techniques of choice analysis and also includes details on data collection and
preparation, model estimation and interpretation and the design of choice
experiments&quot;]
	&lt;li&gt;Gene M. Heyman, &lt;cite&gt;Addiction: A Disorder of Choice&lt;/cite&gt; [&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog/HEYNAT.html&quot;&gt;blurb&lt;/a&gt;]
	&lt;li&gt;Steven J. Humphrey, &quot;Does Learning Diminish Violations of
Independence, Coalescing and
Monotonicity?&quot;, &lt;a
href=&quot;http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11238-006-8047-x&quot;&gt;&lt;cite&gt;Theory and
Decision&lt;/cite&gt; &lt;strong&gt;61&lt;/strong&gt; (2006): 93--128&lt;/a&gt; [&quot;Violations of
expected utility theory are sometimes attributed to imprecise preferences
interacting with a lack of learning opportunity in the experimental
laboratory. [Performs new experiemnts] The data show that whilst in some cases
expected utility maximising behaviour increases with the learning opportunity,
so too do systematic violations. ... [N]o presumption that anomalous behaviour
under risk is transient...&quot;]
	&lt;li&gt;Bryan D. Jones, &lt;cite&gt;Politics and the Architecture of Choice&lt;/cite&gt;
	&lt;li&gt;Kahneman and Tversky (eds.), &lt;cite&gt;Choices, Values, and
Frames&lt;/cite&gt;
	&lt;li&gt;Norbert L. Kerr, Robert J. MacCoun and Geoffrey P. Kramer, &quot;Bias in
judgment: Comparing individuals and groups&quot;, &lt;cite&gt;Psychological
Review&lt;/cite&gt; &lt;strong&gt;103&lt;/strong&gt; (1996): 687--719
[&lt;a href=&quot;http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~maccoun/PsyRev1996.pdf&quot;&gt;Very large PDF
reprint&lt;/a&gt;]
	&lt;li&gt;Norbert L. Kerr and R. Scott Tindale, &quot;Group Performance and
Decision Making&quot;, &lt;a
href=&quot;http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.55.090902.142009&quot;&gt;&lt;cite&gt;Annual
Review of Psychology&lt;/cite&gt; &lt;strong&gt;55&lt;/strong&gt; (2004): 623--655&lt;/a&gt;
	&lt;li&gt;G. Klein
		&lt;ul&gt;
		&lt;li&gt;&lt;cite&gt;Intuition at Work&lt;/cite&gt;
		&lt;li&gt;&lt;cite&gt;Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions&lt;/cite&gt;
		&lt;/ul&gt;
	&lt;li&gt;Daria Knoch, Lorena R. R. Gianotti, Alvaro Pascual-Leone, Valerie
Treyer, Marianne Regard, Martin Hohmann, and Peter Brugger, &quot;Disruption of
Right Prefrontal Cortex by Low-Frequency Repetitive Transcranial Magnetic
Stimulation Induces Risk-Taking
Behavior&quot;, &lt;a href=&quot;http://dx.doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.0804-06.2006&quot;&gt;&lt;cite&gt;The
Journal of Neuroscience&lt;/cite&gt; &lt;strong&gt;26&lt;/strong&gt; (2006): 6469--6472&lt;/a&gt;
	&lt;li&gt;Sarah Lichtenstein and Paul Slovic (eds.), &lt;cite&gt;The Construction of Preference&lt;/cite&gt; [&lt;a href=&quot;http://cambridge.org/9780521542203&quot;&gt;blurb&lt;/a&gt;]
	&lt;li&gt;Yonatan Loewenstein, and H. Sebastian Seung, &quot;Operant matching is a
generic outcome of synaptic plasticity based on the covariance between reward
and neural activity&quot;, &lt;a
href=&quot;http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0505220103&quot;&gt;&lt;cite&gt;Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences&lt;/cite&gt; (USA) &lt;strong&gt;103&lt;/strong&gt; (2006):
15224--15229&lt;/a&gt; [The abstract promises a result about all possible neural
mechanisms having some fairly generic features; this is clearly the right way
to do theoretical neuroscience, but rarely done...]
	&lt;li&gt;Mary Frances Luce, James R. Bettman, and John W. Payne,
&lt;cite&gt;Emotional Decisions: Trade off Difficulty and Coping in Consumer
Choice&lt;/cite&gt; [&lt;a
href=&quot;http://www.press.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/hfs.cgi/00/14727.ctl&quot;&gt;Blurb&lt;/a&gt;]
	&lt;li&gt;Arthur Lupia, Matthew D. McCubbins and Samuel L. Popkin,
&lt;cite&gt;Elements of Reason: Cognition, Choice, and the Bounds of
Rationality&lt;/cite&gt;
	&lt;li&gt;James G. March, &lt;cite&gt;A Primer on Decision-Making: How Decisions
Happen&lt;/cite&gt;
	&lt;li&gt;Laura Martignon and Michael Schmitt, &quot;Simplicity and Robustness of
Fast and Frugal Heuristics&quot;, &lt;citE&gt;Minds and Machines&lt;/cite&gt; &lt;strong&gt;9&lt;/strong&gt;
(1999): 565--593
	&lt;li&gt;Jorge Moll, Frank Krueger, Roland Zahn, Matteo Pardini, Ricardo de
Oliveira-Souza, and Jordan Grafman, &quot;Human fronto-mesolimbic networks guide
decisions about charitable
donation&quot;, &lt;a
href=&quot;http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0604475103&quot;&gt;&lt;cite&gt;Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences&lt;/cite&gt; (USA) &lt;strong&gt;103&lt;/strong&gt; (2006):
15623--15628&lt;/a&gt;
	&lt;li&gt;Nisbett and Ross, &lt;cite&gt;Human Inference: Strategies and
Shortcomings of Social Judgement&lt;/cite&gt;
	&lt;li&gt;Pattelli-Pulmarini, &lt;cite&gt;Inevitable Illusions&lt;/cite&gt;
	&lt;li&gt;David Pears, &lt;cite&gt;Motivated Irrationality&lt;/cite&gt;
	&lt;li&gt;John W. Payne, James R. bettman and Eric J. Johnson, &lt;cite&gt;The
Adaptive Decision Maker&lt;/cite&gt;
	&lt;li&gt;Luiz Pssoa and Srikanth Padmala, &quot;Quantitative prediction of
perceptual decisions during near-threshold fear detection&quot;, &lt;a
href=&quot;http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0500566102&quot;&gt;&lt;cite&gt;Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences&lt;/cite&gt; (USA) &lt;strong&gt;102&lt;/strong&gt; (2005):
5612--5617&lt;/a&gt;
	&lt;li&gt;Fenna H. Poletiek, &lt;cite&gt;Hypothesis Testing Behaviour&lt;/cite&gt;
[&lt;a href=&quot;http://users.fmg.uva.nl/dborsboom/borsboomPoletiek2001.pdf&quot;&gt;Review by
Denny Borsboom&lt;/a&gt;]
	&lt;li&gt;John L. Pollock, &quot;Plans and Decision&quot;, &lt;a
href=&quot;http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11238-004-7318-7&quot;&gt;&lt;cite&gt;Theory and
Decision&lt;/cite&gt; &lt;strong&gt;57&lt;/strong&gt; (2004): 79--107&lt;/a&gt; [&quot;Counterexamples are
constructed for classical decision theory, turning on the fact that actions
must often be chosen in groups rather than individually, i.e., the objects of
rational choice are plans. It is argued that there is no way to define
optimality for plans that makes the finding of optimal plans the desideratum of
rational decision-making. An alternative called 'locally global planning' is
proposed as a replacement for classical decision theory. Decision-making
becomes a non-terminating process without a precise target rather than a
terminating search for an optimal solution.&quot;  This is more normative than the
rest of this notebook, but it'll do for now...]
	&lt;li&gt;Howard Rachlin, &lt;cite&gt;The Science of Self-Control&lt;/cite&gt;
[&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog/RACSCI.html&quot;&gt;Blurb&lt;/a&gt;]
	&lt;li&gt;Amnon Rapoport and J. Neil Bearden, &quot;Strategic behavior in
monkeys&quot;, &lt;a href=&quot;http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2005.03.002&quot;&gt;&lt;cite&gt;Trends
in Cognitive Sciences&lt;/cite&gt; &lt;strong&gt;9&lt;/strong&gt; (2005): 213--215&lt;/a&gt; [&quot;In a
recent paper, Lee et al. examined adaptive decision-making processes by
training monkeys to play a competitive game against a computer programmed to
play using various strategies. They found that the monkeys' responses were
sensitive to the computer's strategies and consistent with reinforcement
learning. Research such as this strongly complements current research in
behavioral economics. We propose some potential future directions for this
work, and put forward conjectures about what might be learned about
decision-making in humans.&quot;]
	&lt;li&gt;James Reason, &lt;cite&gt;Human Error&lt;/cite&gt; [Wonderful author/title
correspondence... &lt;a href=&quot;http://cambridge.org/0521314194&quot;&gt;Blurb&lt;/a&gt;.]
	&lt;li&gt;Riccardo Rebonato, &lt;cite&gt;Plight of the Fortune Tellers: Why We Need
to Manage Financial Risk Differently&lt;/cite&gt;
[&lt;a href=&quot;http://press.princeton.edu/titles/8474.html&quot;&gt;Blurb, ch.  1&lt;/a&gt;]
	&lt;li&gt;K. Richard Ridderinkhof, Markus Ullsperger, Eveline A. Crone and
Sander Niewenhuis, &quot;The Role of the Medial Frontal Cortex in Cognitive
Control&quot;, &lt;a
href=&quot;http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.1100301&quot;&gt;&lt;cite&gt;Science&lt;/cite&gt; &lt;strong&gt;306&lt;/strong&gt;
(2004): 443--447&lt;/a&gt;
	&lt;li&gt;Catrin Rode, Leda Cosmides, Wolfgang Hell and John Tooby, &quot;When and
why do people avoid unknown probabilities in decision under uncertainty?
Testing some predictions from optimal foraging theory&quot;,
&lt;cite&gt;Cognition&lt;/cite&gt; &lt;strong&gt;72&lt;/strong&gt; (1999): 269--304
	&lt;li&gt;Frederic Schick, &lt;cite&gt;Ambiguity and Logic&lt;/cite&gt; [&lt;a href=&quot;http://cambridge.org/9780521531719&quot;&gt;blurb&lt;/a&gt;]
	&lt;li&gt;Barry Schwartz, &lt;cite&gt;The Paradox of Choice: Why More Is
Less&lt;/cite&gt;
	&lt;li&gt;Eldar Shafir and Robyn A. LeBoeuf, &quot;Rationality&quot;, &lt;a
href=&quot;http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.53.100901.135213&quot;&gt;&lt;cite&gt;Annual
Review of Psychology&lt;/cite&gt; &lt;strong&gt;53&lt;/strong&gt; (2002): 491--517&lt;/a&gt;
	&lt;li&gt;Robert J. Sternberg (ed.), &lt;Cite&gt;Why Smart People Can Be So
Stupid&lt;/cite&gt; [&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.yale.edu/yup/books/090331.htm&quot;&gt;Blurb&lt;/a&gt;]
	&lt;li&gt;Leo P. Sugure, Greg S. Corrado and William T. Newsome, &quot;Choosing
the Greater of Two Goods: Neural Currencies for Valuation and Decision Making&quot;,
&lt;a href=&quot;http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/nrn1666&quot;&gt;&lt;cite&gt;Nature Reviews
Neuroscience&lt;/cite&gt; &lt;strong&gt;6&lt;/strong&gt; (2005): 363--375&lt;/a&gt;
	&lt;li&gt;Stuart Sutherland, &lt;cite&gt;Irrationality: Why We Don't Think
Straight&lt;/cite&gt;
	&lt;li&gt;Viktor J. Vanberg, &quot;Rational Choice vs. Program-Based Behavior:
Alternative Theoretical Approaches and Their Relevance for the Study of
Institutions&quot;, &lt;cite&gt;Rationality and Society&lt;/cite&gt; &lt;strong&gt;14&lt;/strong&gt; (2002):
7--54
	&lt;li&gt;Kathleen D. Vohs, Nicole L. Mead, and Miranda R. Goode, &quot;The
Psychological Consequences of Money&quot;, &lt;a
href=&quot;http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.1132491&quot;&gt;&lt;cite&gt;Science&lt;/cite&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;314&lt;/strong&gt; (2006): 1154--1156&lt;/a&gt;
	&lt;/ul&gt;
</description>
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